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CORVELLO V. WELLS FARGO BANK: LENDING
SUPPORT FOR A NEW GENERATION OF
HAMP LITIGATION AND MORTGAGE RELIEF
Byron Tuyay
I. INTRODUCTION
In October 2008, Congress passed the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act (EESA) in response to the worst economic
recession the United States had suffered since the Great Depression.1
A major contributor to the recession was the foreclosure crisis that
swept the nation.2 Consequently, the centerpiece of EESA featured
the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), which directed the
Secretary of the Treasury (“Treasury”) to “implement a plan that
seeks to maximize assistance to homeowners” and to incentivize loan
servicers of underlying mortgages to take advantage of available
programs to minimize foreclosures.3
In 2009, the Obama Administration unveiled the Home
Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) with the aim of curbing
avoidable foreclosures.4 HAMP encourages loan servicers to modify
 J.D. Candidate, May 2015, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. Politics, New York
University, May 2009. I would like to thank the editors and staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles
Law Review for their commitment to the editorial process. I am also extremely grateful to
Professors Bryan Hull and Christopher Hawthorne for their continual guidance and
encouragement. Finally, thanks to my family for their love and support, especially my
grandmother, Natividad C. Roan, who was my first writing tutor.
1. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765
(2008); Arsen Sarapinian, Fighting Foreclosure: Using Contract Law to Enforce the Home
Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), 64 HASTINGS L.J. 905, 906 (2013).
2. Sarapinian, supra note 1, at 906; see also Adam J. Levitin, Resolving the Foreclosure
Crisis: Modification of Mortgages in Bankruptcy, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 565, 570 (2009)
(“Foreclosures also depress housing and commercial real-estate prices throughout entire
neighborhoods[,] . . . [and] property-value declines caused by foreclosure hurt local businesses
and erode state and local government tax bases.”) (citations omitted).
3. 12 U.S.C. § 5219a(a) (2012).
4. Home Affordable Modification Program Supplemental Directive 09-01, at 1 (2009)
[hereinafter Supplemental Directive 09-01], available at https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal
/programs/docs/hamp_servicer/sd0901.pdf; see also 12 U.S.C. § 5201 (2008) (authorizing the
United States Department of Treasury to create and implement a plan to decrease the rate of
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home loans to reduce monthly mortgage payments for distressed
borrowers facing imminent foreclosure.5 Through HAMP, qualified
borrowers may lower their monthly loan payments to 31 percent of
their monthly income and thereby decrease their risk of foreclosure.6
Before receiving an offer for permanent loan modification,
however, a borrower must complete a trial payment period (TPP),
during which the borrower preliminarily makes lower monthly
payments on his or her mortgage while the loan servicer determines
the borrower’s eligibility for a permanent modification through
HAMP, based on the borrower’s personal financial information.7
Phillip Corvello (“Corvello”) and Jeffery and Karen Lucia (“the
Lucias”) sought permanent loan modifications through HAMP8 and
received TPP plans from their mortgage servicer, Wells Fargo Bank
(“Wells Fargo”).9 After the expiration of their trial periods, however,
Corvello and the Lucias were denied offers for permanent loan
modification.10
Corvello and the Lucias filed separate actions against Wells
Fargo in federal court, invoking diversity jurisdiction and alleging
that California law governed their claims.11 Both complaints alleged
that—because the plaintiffs had complied with the express terms of
the TPP agreement—the loan servicer was bound by an enforceable
contract to offer them permanent modifications.12 In dismissing the
breach of contract claims, “the district court concluded that[,]
accepting the plaintiff’s allegations as true, the language of the TPP
could not support a contract for a permanent loan modification.”13
foreclosures).
5. Under EESA, the term “servicer” is defined as “the person responsible for servicing of a
loan (including the person who makes or holds a loan if such person also services the loan).”
12 U.S.C. § 5220(a)(4) (2006); 12 U.S.C. § 2605(i)(2) (2006); Supplemental Directive 09-01,
supra note 4, at 1; see also Sarapinian, supra note 1, at 913 (“A servicer is neither a lender nor
investor but is often a third-party financial institution that is hired by investors to manage and
account for the loan.”).
6. Making Home Affordable Program: Handbook for Servicers of Non-GSE Mortgages
105–08 (2013) [hereinafter MHA Handbook], available at https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal
/programs/docs/hamp_servicer/mhahandbook_43.pdf.
7. Id. at 122.
8. Corvello v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 728 F.3d 878, 881 (9th Cir. 2013).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 882.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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On appeal, Corvello’s and the Lucias’ cases were consolidated
and the Ninth Circuit addressed whether the terms of the TPP
agreement constituted an enforceable contract under which Wells
Fargo was obligated to offer permanent modifications to Corvello
and the Lucias after they satisfied their obligations under the TPP;
the panel held that it did.14
In Corvello, the Ninth Circuit followed the Seventh Circuit’s
recent decision in Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.15 by interpreting
HAMP-related claims in favor of consumer protection.16 The Ninth
Circuit’s holding in Corvello also signals a departure from
competing rationales adopted in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits,
which prohibit individuals from enforcing TPP agreements against
loan servicers.17 Thus, by validating contract-based TPP claims,
Corvello strengthens plaintiff-borrowers’ claims in future Ninth
Circuit HAMP litigation.18
Part II of this Comment presents the historical background and
legislative history of HAMP. In Part III, this Comment summarizes
the relevant facts and the arguments advanced by the parties on
appeal in Corvello. Part IV sets forth the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in
its decision. Part V analyzes the significance of the holding in
Corvello, specifically, the consequences of adopting the Seventh
Circuit’s interpretation of the TPP and contract-based HAMP claims
for distressed mortgagors in the Ninth Circuit. Finally, Part VI
concludes that the Ninth Circuit properly upheld the plain-language
interpretation of the TPP terms in Corvello, thereby avoiding
injustice and serving HAMP’s legislative goals.
II. HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK
After Congress passed EESA in 2008, the Treasury, acting
under direction of Congress, launched HAMP in 2009.19 HAMP
helps distressed homeowners that have fallen behind on monthly
mortgage payments by establishing a process and procedure through
which borrowers can reduce monthly mortgage payments to
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 880–81, 883.
673 F.3d 547 (7th Cir. 2012).
Corvello, 728 F.3d at 883; see infra Part V.A.
See infra Part V.A.
See infra Part V.A.
Corvello, 728 F.3d at 880.
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approximately 31 percent of the borrower’s income.20 HAMP was
designed to incentivize banks to refinance mortgages, thereby
reducing foreclosures and allowing distressed borrowers to stay in
their homes.21
Through HAMP, the Treasury entered into Servicer
Participation Agreements (SPAs) with the nation’s largest home-loan
servicers.22 Under these SPAs, loan servicers are eligible to receive
TARP funds as long as they facilitate loan modifications to prevent
avoidable foreclosures.23 Participating loan servicers, such as Wells
Fargo, can receive up to $1,600 in federal incentive compensation for
each permanent loan modification offered through HAMP.24
In April 2009, the Treasury issued the first of a series of
directives and policies in an attempt to provide servicers with
uniform guidance in implementing HAMP modifications.25 Under
HAMP, qualified borrowers initiate the process of modifying their
home loans by submitting personal financial information to their loan
servicers.26 Before receiving a permanent loan modification,
borrowers must pay reduced monthly mortgage payments for a trial
period.27 At the end of the trial period, borrowers who submitted
payments for each month during the period and whose personal
financial representations remained accurate during that same period
receive Modification Agreements that permanently modify the terms
of their loans.28
The loan servicers must report to the borrowers—regardless of
their eligibility or ineligibility—the results of the eligibility

20. Id.; see MHA Handbook, supra note 6, at 105–08.
21. See 12 U.S.C. § 5219a (2012).
22. See Sarapinian, supra note 1, at 914–15 & n.71.
23. Supplemental Directive 09-01, supra note 4, at 23.
24. Id.; Brief for Defendant-Appellee Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. at 7, Corvello v. Wells Fargo
Bank, NA, 728 F.3d 878 (9th Cir. 2013) (Nos. 11-16234, 11-16242), 2012 WL 1650301, at *6–7;
MHA Handbook, supra note 6, at 140. The amount of TARP funds that a loan servicer receives
for any given loan modification depends on the degree of the borrower’s delinquency in
connection with the underlying mortgage. For a detailed account of the financial incentives
offered to servicers, see Sarapinian supra note 1, at 915 n.75; 12 U.S.C. § 5219 (2012).
25. Supplemental Directive 09-01, supra note 4, at 1.
26. To qualify for HAMP, borrowers must satisfy certain threshold requirements relating to
the date their loans were originated and other indicators of personal financial hardship. See
Corvello, 728 F.3d at 880.
27. Id. at 880–81.
28. Supplemental Directive 09-01, supra note 4, at 14–15.
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determinations made during the trial period.29 In the event that the
borrowers are ineligible for permanent modifications under HAMP,
loan servicers should also consider foreclosure prevention
alternatives for such a borrower.30
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
“In May 2009, Corvello sought a loan modification from Wells
Fargo because he was struggling to make his mortgage payments.”31
Corvello received information about the permanent loan
modification program and responded by sending an application to
Wells Fargo, which included copies of pay stubs and other personal
financial information.32
Wells Fargo sent Corvello a written TPP agreement on July 17,
2009.33 The TPP included a cover letter stating that Wells Fargo
would modify Corvello’s loan so long as his financial information
was accurate and he complied with the terms of the TPP.34 It read:
If I am in compliance with this Loan Trial Period and my
[personal financial] representations in Section 1 continue to
be true in all material respects, then the Lender will provide
me with a Loan Modification Agreement, as set forth in
Section 3, that would amend and supplement (1) the
Mortgage on the Property, and (2) the Note secured by the
Mortgage. . . . I understand that after I sign and return two
copies of this Plan to the Lender, the Lender will send me a
signed copy of this Plan if I qualify for the Offer or will
send me written notice that I do not qualify for the Offer.35
Paragraph 2F of the TPP notified the borrower of the party’s
obligations:
If prior to the Modification Effective Date, (i) the Lender
does not provide me a fully executed copy of this Plan and
the Modification Agreement; (ii) I have not made the Trial
29. Id.
30. Id. at 15.
31. Appellants’ Opening Brief at 6, Corvello, 728 F.3d 878 (Nos. 11-16234, 11-16242),
2012 WL 1132108 at *6.
32. Id. at 6–7.
33. Id. at 7.
34. Id. at 7; Corvello, 728 F.3d at 881.
35. Corvello, 728 F.3d at 881; Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 31, at 7.
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Period payments required under Section 2 of this Plan; or
(iii) the Lender determines that my representations in
Section 1 are no longer true and correct, the Loan
Documents will not be modified and this Plan will
terminate.36
The TPP expressly stated that no modification would take effect
“unless and until” Corvello received a signed copy of the
modification agreement, but assured him that the bank would notify
him one way or another about his eligibility for a loan
modification.37 Accordingly, Paragraph 2G read:
I understand that the Plan is not a modification of the Loan
Documents and that the Loan Documents will not be
modified unless and until (i) I meet all of the conditions
required for modification, (ii) I receive a fully executed
copy of a Modification Agreement, and (iii) the
Modification Effective Date has passed.38
Corvello sent a signed copy of the TPP agreement to Wells
Fargo.39 He contended that, despite the performance of his
obligations under the TPP in the subsequent three months, Wells
Fargo never offered him a permanent modification, nor did it notify
him that he did not qualify for the modification program.40
Karen and Jeffrey Lucia were in a similar financial situation as
Corvello in late 2009.41 The Lucias asserted that, during a phone
conversation in February 2010, Wells Fargo offered them a TPP with
the promise of a permanent modification if payments were timely
completed, and if their financial information remained accurate
throughout the trial period.42 After five months, however, the Lucias
still had not received an offer for permanent modification, nor had
they received notification that they were ineligible for HAMP.43
36. Corvello, 728 F.3d at 881–82.
37. Id. at 882.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 31, at 8; see also Lucia v. Wells Fargo Bank
N.A., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1063 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (“Due to the economic recession, the Lucias
lost their jobs and, struggling to make their mortgage payments, sought out a loan
modification.”), rev’d sub nom. Corvello v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 728 F.3d 878 (9th Cir. 2013).
42. Corvello, 728 F.3d at 882.
43. Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 31, at 8–9.
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Instead, Wells Fargo terminated the TPP and foreclosed on, and
subsequently sold, the Lucias’ home.44
Corvello and the Lucias separately filed complaints against
Wells Fargo in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California.45 Corvello’s and the Lucias’ complaints sought
permanent modification of their respective home loans under
California law.46 Their complaints alleged that Wells Fargo’s failure
to fulfill its obligations under the TPP to either offer permanent loan
modifications or send notification of ineligibility under HAMP
constituted a breach of the enforceable contract that formed when the
borrowers met their obligations under the TPP.47 Additionally, both
complaints alleged promissory estoppel, breaches of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, violations of California’s Unfair
Competition Law, and violations of the Rosenthal Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.48
The district court issued orders granting Wells Fargo’s motions
to dismiss both actions.49 The court concluded in both cases that,
accepting the plaintiffs’ allegations as true, the language of the TPP
“could not support a contract for permanent loan modification.”50 In
both cases, the district court held that, under the provisions in
Paragraph 2G, Wells Fargo’s promise to offer a permanent loan
modification was conditioned on the bank sending the plaintiffs a
signed Modification Agreement.51 As such, the district court
concluded that Wells Fargo was not required to offer Corvello or the
Lucias a permanent loan modification, since Wells Fargo never sent
them signed Modification Agreements.52
On appeal, Wells Fargo maintained that the district court
properly found that the terms of the TPP did not constitute an offer
for permanent modification.53 Relying on the language of Paragraph
2G of the TPP, Wells Fargo argued that any subsequent offer for
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Corvello, 728 F.3d at 882.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 882–83.
Id. at 882.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 883.
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permanent modification did not exist “unless and until” a borrower
received a fully executed copy of a Modification Agreement.54
IV. REASONING OF THE COURT
The Ninth Circuit adopted the reasoning of the recent Seventh
Circuit decision in Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.55 In Wigod,
under similar facts, Wells Fargo raised the same defense that it raised
in Corvello.56 The Seventh Circuit rejected Wells Fargo’s argument
that Paragraph 2G of the TPP agreement precluded the existence of
any offer for permanent modification “unless and until” the servicer
sent the borrower a signed Modification Agreement.57
Notably, the Seventh Circuit found that the TPP agreement
contained sufficient consideration because it required the borrower to
“open new escrow accounts, undergo credit counseling . . . [and]
provide and vouch for the truth of her financial information.”58
Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit held that any conditions precedent
to Wells Fargo’s obligation to offer permanent modification were to
be satisfied by the borrower—not by Wells Fargo.59 The Seventh
Circuit thus concluded that, when Wigod satisfied those conditions
(i.e., complied with the requirements of the trial plan and maintained
accurate financial information throughout the trial period), Wells
Fargo had a contractual obligation to offer her a permanent loan
modification or to otherwise send notice of her ineligibility.60
Additionally, the Seventh Circuit found Wells Fargo’s
interpretation of the TPP to be suspect because such interpretation
allowed Wells Fargo to avoid any obligations under the TPP simply
by refraining from sending borrowers a signed Modification
Agreement.61 Moreover, the Seventh Circuit concluded that Wells
Fargo’s proposed interpretation essentially nullified the express
promise to send borrowers a signed Modification Agreement if the
borrower complied with his or her obligations under the TPP.62 The
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id.
Id. (citing Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A, 673 F.3d 547 (7th Cir. 2012)).
Corvello, 728 F.3d at 883; Wigod, 673 F.3d at 562–63.
Corvello, 728 F.3d at 883; Wigod, 673 F.3d at 563.
Wigod, 673 F.3d at 564.
Id. at 562.
Id.
Id. at 563.
Id.

CORVELLO V. WELLS FARGO BANK

2014]

12/11/2014 10:57 PM

HAMP LITIGATION AND MORTGAGE RELIEF

989

court also reasoned that adopting Wells Fargo’s reading of the TPP
would allow loan servicers to refuse permanent modification for
“any reason whatsoever . . . turning an otherwise straightforward
offer into an illusion.”63
Similarly, in Corvello, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the “more
natural and fair” interpretation of the TPP is that loan servicers must
send borrowers signed Modification Agreements only after
borrowers meet their obligations, assuming they did not notify
borrowers of ineligibility.64 Like the court in Wigod, the Ninth
Circuit held that if Paragraph 2G dictated the parties’ obligations
under the TPP, it would leave the ultimate decision to offer loan
modifications to the “unfettered discretion” of Wells Fargo.65
Instead, the courts in Wigod and Corvello interpreted the borrowers’
receipt of the signed Modification Agreements as a condition
precedent to permanent modifications taking effect.66 In other words,
the modifications were not complete until the above conditions were
met.67 Under Paragraph 1 Section 3 of the TPP, however, “Wells
Fargo still had an obligation to offer [Corvello and the Lucias] a
permanent modification” if they satisfied their end of the bargains.68
Wells Fargo countered that Wigod was distinguishable from
Corvello because—unlike the plaintiff in Wigod—neither Corvello
nor the Lucias received a signed Modification Agreement. Therefore,
Wells Fargo argued, under Paragraph 2F, the TPP should have
terminated if the borrowers did not receive a signed plan and
Modification Agreement.69
The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument because the holding in
Wigod did not turn on the borrowers receiving the signed
Modification Agreement.70 Rather, the Ninth Circuit noted that under
the terms of the TPP, when Wells Fargo initiated the borrower’s
TPP, Wells Fargo had the opportunity to determine the borrower’s
eligibility for a permanent modification.71 If the borrower did not
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
Corvello, 728 F.3d at 883.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 883–84.
Id. (citing Wigod, 673 F.3d at 563) (emphasis added).
Id. at 884.
Id.
Id.
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qualify, “[Wells Fargo] could have and should have denied [the
borrower] a modification on that basis.”72
Wells Fargo also “contend[ed] that the Lucias’ breach of
contract claim [could not] survive the statute of frauds because it
[was] an oral agreement to modify the terms of the mortgage.”73 The
court rejected this argument and held that, because the Lucias alleged
full performance of their obligations under the contract, they could
enforce the remaining promises under the TPP.74
In sum, the Ninth Circuit concluded that (1) Corvello and the
Lucias could assert their breach of contract claims against Wells
Fargo because, under the TPP, loan servicers are obligated to offer
borrowers permanent mortgage modifications when the borrowers
have performed their obligations under the TPP; and (2) Wells Fargo
was engaged in debt collection under California’s Rosenthal Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act.75 The court of appeals reversed the
district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further
proceedings.76
V. ANALYSIS
The Ninth Circuit’s holding in Corvello demonstrates a shift
toward interpreting TPPs in favor of consumers. Corvello advances
consumer interests in two ways. First, it permits distressed
homeowners to enforce the terms of the TPP under applicable state
law, thereby allowing homeowners to hold loan servicers
accountable to the HAMP Treasury guidelines. Second, it avoids the
injustice that would result were Wells Fargo allowed to keep
borrowers’ trial payments without offering anything in exchange,
and it advances HAMP’s legislative purpose.
A. Holding the Door Open for
HAMP-Related Litigation
State and federal courts across the United States have uniformly
held that HAMP does not imply a private right of action.77 Unlike
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. (quoting Wigod, 673 F.3d at 562) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 885.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Wigod, 673 F.3d at 560 n.4 (“We have identified more than 80 other federal cases in
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federal consumer protection laws, an administrative program such as
HAMP does not provide an explicit means for holding participating
loan servicers accountable for their obligations under the
Supplemental Treasury Guidelines.78 As a result, individual and class
action lawsuits arising from alleged violations of the Supplemental
Treasury Guidelines have been widely dismissed. Borrowers have
little hope, if any, of finding relief in courts.79 Nonetheless,
distressed borrowers have creatively argued various theories of
liability in “HAMP-related” actions against loan servicers.80
Generally, however, such attempts have proven unsuccessful.81
Corvello strengthens plaintiff-borrowers’ claims in what has
been coined the “second generation” of HAMP-TPP litigation.82 The
court’s holding with respect to the Lucias’ claims in Corvello lends
circuit-level support to the proposition that borrowers may defeat
servicers’ statute of frauds defense if the borrowers have performed
their obligations under the TPP.83 Additionally, Corvello further
expands plausible theories of loan servicer liability by affirming that
HAMP servicers engage in debt collection, and therefore, Corvello
provides borrowers additional protection from loan servicers through
state fair debt collection statutes.84 Accordingly, Corvello will likely
serve as a launching pad for future HAMP-related claims against
servicers based on state common law and consumer protection laws.
Corvello also signals a departure from the Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits’ treatment of contract-based TPP claims. For example, in
Pennington v. HSBC Bank,85 the Fifth Circuit refused to enforce the
which mortgagors brought HAMP-related claims. . . . Courts have uniformly rejected these claims
because HAMP does not create a private federal right of action for borrowers against servicers.”);
see also John R. Chiles & Matthew T. Mitchell, HAMP: An Overview of the Program and Recent
Litigation Trends, 65 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 194, 197 n.10 (2011) (providing a survey of
cases holding that there is no private right of action under HAMP).
78. See Chiles & Mitchell, supra note 77, at 197 n.10 (providing a survey of cases holding
that there is no right of enforcement or action).
79. Id. at 197–98; Harry N. Arger, Support for Dismissal of State Law Based HAMP TPP
Cases, BUS. L. TODAY, Jan. 2013, at 2.
80. Chiles & Mitchell, supra note 77, at 197–200 (explaining that in addition to claims based
on breach of contract and state consumer protection statutes, plaintiffs elsewhere have asserted
claims based on constitutional challenges, tort law, and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act).
81. Id.; Arger, supra note 79, at 1–2.
82. Arger, supra note 79, at 1.
83. Corvello v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 728 F.3d 878, 885 (9th Cir. 2013).
84. Id.
85. 493 F. App’x 548, 554 (5th Cir. 2012).
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terms of the TPP agreeement against a servicer in the absence of
evidence that the servicer signed and returned the Modification
Agreement to the borrower.86 Corvello therefore revives the rationale
in Wigod, which the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits refused to follow.
Similarly, in Miller v. Chase Home Finance, LLC,87 the Eleventh
Circuit narrowly interpreted a TPP agreement in holding that, under
the TPP, servicers promise only to “temporarily modify” the loan.88
The Pennington and Miller courts, however, seemed to reach
their conclusions without any reference to the plain language in
Paragraph 1 Section 3 of the TPP, which conditions the offer for
permanent modification on the borrower’s performance.89 To the
contrary, the court in Pennington relied primarily on Paragraph 2G to
support the finding that no contract for permanent modification
existed “unless and until” the servicer sent the borrower a
Modification Agreement.90 This was the very argument Wells Fargo
raised—and that the Ninth Circuit squarely rejected—in Corvello.91
The interpretations advanced by the courts in Pennington and
Miller run counter to consumer interests. As noted by the court in
Corvello, such interpretations inevitably leave loan modifications to
the unfettered discretion of loan servicers.92 Furthermore, servicers,
who decide whether to offer such loan modifications, are motivated
by incentives that favor foreclosure over loan modification.93
Additionally, loan servicers, unlike lenders or investors, are
compensated regardless of the performance of the loan.94 These
conflicting interests suggest that a minimum level of accountability
86. Id. at 554.
87. 677 F.3d 1113 (11th Cir. 2012).
88. Id. at 1117.
89. See id. at 1116–17 (“Miller . . . lacks standing to pursue his breach of contract, breach of
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, and promissory estoppel claims insofar as they are
alleged on an alleged breach of Chase’s HAMP obligations.”); See Pennington, 493 F. App’x at
554 (holding that there was no enforceable contract between the borrower and servicer because
the servicer’s failure to send a signed copy of the agreement to the borrower was evidence that the
lender did not intend to be bound by the TPP).
90. Pennington, 493 F. App’x at 555.
91. Corvello v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 728 F.3d 878, 883 (9th Cir. 2013).
92. Id.
93. See Diane E. Thompson, Foreclosing Modifications: How Servicer Incentives
Discourage Loan Modifications, 86 WASH. L. REV. 755, 761, 770–71 (2011) (arguing that weak
incentives for servicers to perform modifications cause foreclosures to outpace modifications and
prevent modifications that would make economic sense for investors).
94. See id. at 761, 767–68.
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on the part of loan servicers is necessary to ensure the just
administration of HAMP in favor of consumer interests. The holding
in Corvello creates a threshold level of accountability by imposing
on loan servicers the obligation to terminate the TPP by notifying
borrowers of their HAMP eligibility rather than prolonging the TPP
term indefinitely. Such an obligation preserves servicers’ incentivebased compensation structure while affording some avenues of
mortgage relief for borrowers.
Indeed, the holdings in Wigod and Corvello should not implicate
servicers that comply with the procedures outlined in the latest MHA
Servicer Handbook.95 Servicers maintain fiscal safeguards built in to
HAMP’s federal compensation incentive structure because they are
not required to offer permanent modifications under HAMP, unless
the Net Present Value of the loan indicates that it would be more
profitable to modify the loan than to initiate a foreclosure.96 This, in
addition to the profits garnered from TARP funds for each offer for
permanent modification,97 creates a win-win situation for loan
servicers and the lenders of the underlying mortgages. Accordingly,
Corvello’s TPP interpretation advances consumer interests, but
leaves intact the compensation incentives for servicers to offer
HAMP loan modifications.

95. The Supplemental Treasury Guidelines and latest MHA handbook have since abandoned
the two-step eligibility processes disputed in Pennington and Miller in favor of a one-time
eligibility determination at the beginning of the TPP process. Section 2.3 of the current MHA
handbook states that “servicer[s] must send a Borrower Notice to every borrower that has been
evaluated for HAMP, but is not offered a TPP, is not offered a permanent modification or is at
risk of losing eligibility for HAMP.” MHA Handbook, supra note 6, at 82; see also Arger, supra
note 79, at 2.
96. The Net Present Value (NPV) test is a calculation used by investors and loan servicers to
determine the value of a mortgage. All loans that meet HAMP eligibility criteria are evaluated
using a standardized NPV test that compares the NPV of a loan with and without the HAMP
modification. Servicers must offer a loan modification in circumstances where the modification
would increase the NPV of a mortgage, but are not required to offer a modification if it would
decrease the NPV of a mortgage. MHA Handbook, supra note 6, at 118–19; see also
CheckMyNPV.com Frequently Asked Questions, CHECKMYNVP.COM, https://www
.checkmynpv.com/sites/all/themes/npvtool/pdf/CheckMyNPV-FAQ.pdf (last visited July 27,
2014).
97. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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B. Avoiding Injustice
The Ninth Circuit’s approach promotes HAMP’s legislative
purpose—to prevent avoidable foreclosures.98 Corvello’s TPP
interpretation complements the Treasury’s policy objectives by
allowing borrowers to enforce their potential rights to mortgage
relief through the courts. As noted above, Corvello held—at
minimum—that borrowers could successfully plead a contract-based
cause of action against loan servicers when the borrower has met his
or her obligations under the TPP by maintaining accurate financial
information and making timely payments throughout the term of the
TPP. This is a significant development because it promotes
efficiency across the mortgage modification industry. As an
illustration, loan servicers that neglect to notify borrowers of their
ineligibility for a permanent loan modification at the end of their trial
periods, as Wells Fargo did in Corvello, now risk exposure to
liability under common law.99 Such risk necessarily places some
limits on the discretion that loan servicers have in deciding whether
to offer permanent loan modifications. Accordingly, Corvello
fortifies the underlying policy objectives of HAMP.
The “natural and fair” interpretation of the TPP endorsed by the
courts in Corvello and Wigod has since been adopted in the
Treasury’s most recent MHA Servicer Handbook.100 This handbook,
which provides uniform programmatic guidance for loan
modification procedures across the industry, directs loan servicers to
send signed Modification Agreements “no later than 30 calendar
days after receipt of the agreement executed by the borrower, and the
borrower’s compliance with all conditions set forth in the trial period
plan notice.”101 Imposing such a time constraint avoids the problems
created when borrowers, like Corvello and the Lucias, are left
waiting in limbo long after the end of their trial periods.
98. 12 U.S.C. § 5219(a)(1) (2009).
99. See Corvello v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 728 F.3d 878, 883–85 (9th Cir. 2013); see also
Lueras v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 163 Cal. Rptr. 3d 804 (2013) (holding that a plaintiffborrower could state a claim for breach of oral contract where the borrower continued to make
temporary monthly mortgage payments for 10 months and the lender failed to assess the
feasibility or implement a permanent solution).
100. MHA Handbook, supra note 6, at 127.
101. Id. at 127.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In sum, the Ninth Circuit correctly upheld the validity of
contract-and common law–based HAMP claims. As HAMP does not
imply a private right of action, Corvello arms borrowers with a
much-needed sword by preserving their opportunity to enforce
contractual rights under the TPP and to seek foreclosure relief in
courts. By adopting a fair and natural construction of TPP
agreements, such that borrowers can trigger the loan servicer’s
obligation to offer permanent modification by satisfying the
conditions of the TPP, the court has bolstered HAMP’s policy
objectives and avoided the unjust result of granting loan servicers the
unfettered discretion to deny requests for permanent loan
modifications.
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